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INTRODUCTION

In ratifying NAFTA, the governments of Canada, Mexico and
the United States resolved to "[establish] clear and mutually
advantageous rules governing their trade; [ensure] a predictable
commercial framework for business planning and investment,"'
"eliminate barriers to trade [,]" and "create effective procedures...
for the resolution of disputes."2 Chapter 11 implements these
objectives by providing standards for the treatment of foreign
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 605, available at http://sice.oas.org/trade/nafta (last visited March 28, 2003)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Id. art. 102(1)(a)&(e).
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investors and establishing procedures for arbitration of investorstate disputes.3 Chapter 11 is an increasingly important aspect of
NAFTA, as evidenced by the growing number of claims under the
agreement, 6 which permits individual investors to sue signatory
nations directly to enforce rights guaranteed therein.5
In November of 1998, The Loewen Group, Inc. ("TLGI"), a
Canadian corporation involved in the death-care industry, filed a
claim pursuant to NAFTA under the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Additional Facility
Rules against the United States government. The claim sought
damages in excess of $600 million for alleged injuries that Loewen6
suffered as a party to litigation in Mississippi state courts.
Loewen argues, inter alia, that an award of punitive damages in a
civil suit is tantamount to an indirect expropriation under NAFTA
Article 1110. 7 Chapter 11 of NAFTA on investment establishes
protections for investors and procedures for arbitration of investor-state disputes.8 Article 1110 of NAFTA prohibits the uncompensated expropriation of investments made by foreign investors. 9
The United States moved to dismiss Loewen's claims, inter
alia, objecting to the jurisdiction of the Loewen Tribunal. ° In its
January 2001 decision, the Tribunal rejected the U.S.'s jurisdictional objection and dismissed the motion on all other grounds as
more appropriately addressed on the merits. 1 The Tribunal concluded that the judgment of a state court in litigation between pri3. Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 48 (2001).
4. See U.S. Department of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations,availableat
http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3439.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). Six cases have been
filed against the United States of America; four cases have been filed against the
Government of Canada; eight cases have been filed against The United Mexican
States.
5. Ren6 Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil
Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U L. REV. 229, 233 (2001).
6. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, case no. ARB(AF)/98/3
(filed Oct. 30, 1998), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3755.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2003).
7. Id.; see also Counter-Memorial of the United States Government (filed Mar.
30, 2001), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3755.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Counter-Memorial].
8. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11.
9. Id. art. 1110.
10. See U.S. Department of State, Cases Filed Against the United States of
America, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3741.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter U.S. Department of State]; see also Todd Weiler et al., Foreign
Investment in the United States, 35 IN'L L. 363, 367 (2001).
11. U.S. Department of State, supra note 10.
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vate parties constituted a "measure" under NAFTA within the
definition of Article 201.12 Article 201 defines "measure" as including "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice." 3
The Tribunal deemed Article 201's inclusive definition inconsistent with the notion that state judicial action is not such a "measure."14 This aspect of the Loewen Tribunal's preliminary decision
indicates that NAFTA Tribunals deem most forms of state action
or inaction, irrespective of the branch of state involved, to constitute a measure for purposes of Chapter 11 claims."
Thus far, only one claimant under Chapter 11, Metalclad
Corp. v. The United Mexican States, has been successful. 6 It arose
from conduct of a Mexican State that "resulted in the complete
loss of the claimant's investment." 7 Although NAFTA arbitration
decisions do not have precedential value, they do indicate
approaches future panels are likely to take. 8 This comment will
analyze the Loewen claim in light of the relevant NAFTA provisions and the Metalclad Arbitration, including the subsequent
Arbitral Appeal in the British Columbia Supreme Court. This
comment will also provide an overview of the arbitral process as
laid out in NAFTA. The comment concludes by suggesting that
the Loewen claim, though superficially tenable, will likely fail
because it side-steps crucial procedural obstacles in its expropriation argument.

II.

BACKGROUND: JEREMIAH J. O'KEEFE, ET AL. V. THE

LOEWEN GROUP, INC., ET AL.

In 1995, Jeremiah O'Keefe, a Biloxi businessman, brought
suit in a Mississippi state court against The Loewen Group, Inc.
("TLGI"), a Canadian corporation, and its founder, Raymond L.
Loewen, a Canadian citizen. 9 The litigation arose out of a com12. Decision on Hearingof Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction,
Jan. 5, 2001, para. 40, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3755.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Decision].
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 201.
14. Decision, supra note 12, at para. 40.
15. Weiler, supra note 10, at 367.
16. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
17. Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA:
Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 285 (2002).
18. Lerner, supra note 5, at 263.
19. Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, Canadian CorporationFound Liable in
Mississippi Courts Uses NAFTA to Claim Legal System Violated its Rights, available
at http:/ / www.law.nyu.edu / kingsbuyb 1/fall01/ intlilaw/ unitl / intljlaw200l_unitl_
loewen4.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter CanadianCorp. Found Liable].
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mercial dispute between O'Keefe and Loewen, who were competitors in the funeral home and funeral insurance industries in
Mississippi. 0 O'Keefe alleged that Loewen committed predatory
and anti-competitive acts in a scheme to dominate the local market and drive local funeral and insurance companies out of
business .21
Specifically, the dispute involved three contracts between
O'Keefe and Loewen valued by O'Keefe at $980,000, and one
alleged contract involving a proposed exchange of a Loewen
funeral home insurance company and O'Keefe funeral homes
worth approximately $4 million and $2.5 million, respectively.2 2
O'Keefe's amended complaint, alleging breach of contract, common-law fraud, and violations of state antitrust laws, sought
actual damages of $5 million.2 3 In a successful strategy to bar
Loewen's removal to federal court, O'Keefe named local Mississippi corporations owned by Loewen as additional defendants.2 4
O'Keefe's lead trial counsel was Willie Gary,2 5 a flamboyant
plaintiffs' lawyer known for his success in winning substantial
awards.2 ' During the trial, despite court instructions to the attorneys not to make public statements about the case, Gary told the
congregation of a local black church that a large verdict in the case
would answer his prayers. 27 Gary also spoke on a radio talk program popular among the local black community.28 Moreover, the
jury was not sequestered.29
Michael Krauss, in his article on the subject, described
O'Keefe v. Loewen as "[tihe [tirial [diebacle," stating that Gary's
trial presentation was "essentially devoid of legal arguments
20. The Loewen Group, Inc., case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 2.
21. Id. para. 33.
22. Id. para. 2.
23. Id. para. 33.
24. Id. para. 37.
25. Id. para. 38; see Michael I. Krauss, NAFTA Meets the American Torts Process:
O'Keefe v. Loewen, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 76-77 (2000) (detailing the background of
the prominent plaintiffs' lawyer from Florida. Gary clearly influenced the litigation.
Six months prior to his participation, the Loewen legal team rebuffed a $4 million
demand from O'Keefe's attorneys. Three months before trial, Gary sent Loewen a
new settlement demand of $125 million).
26. Krauss, supra note 25, at 76 (noting that Gary has won twenty-five suits of $1
million or more during his career).
27. The Loewen Group, Inc., case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 39.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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regarding contract law."" Throughout the trial, O'Keefe's attorneys, over the objections of defense counsel, made highly prejudicial comments. Gary contrasted Loewen's "foreign" Canadian
nationality to "O'Keefe's Mississippi roots" and World War II military service record. 1 The plaintiff presented testimony that
O'Keefe, a white man, was not racist. The plaintiff also introduced testimony suggesting that Loewen was racist.2 O'Keefe's
attorneys also made "class-based distinctions" between their client, portrayed "as running a family-owned business," and Loewen,
"portrayed as a large, wealthy corporation." 3 All of Loewen's
objections to this evidence on relevance grounds were overruled. 4
Gary's closing argument ignored details of contract and tort law,
and instead focused on themes of nationality, race, and wealth.3
The Mississippi jury awarded O'Keefe $100 million in compensatory damages, including $74 million for emotional distress,
and $400 million in punitive damages, for a total award of $500
million. 6 The New York Times reported that the jury foreman
made a public statement after the verdict that Ray Loewen "'was
a rich, dumb Canadian politician who thought he could come down
and pull the wool over the eyes of a good ole Mississippi boy. It
didn't work.' 3 7 The verdict, which represented 78% of Loewen's
total net worth, was the largest award in Mississippi history "and
was over 100 times greater than the entire net worth of the com38
panies to be exchanged in the principal underlying transaction."
Mississippi law requires a losing defendant who wishes to
appeal prior to paying damages to post an appeal bond for 125% of
the judgment in order to protect the interests of the judgment
creditor during the appeals process. 39 In this case, 125% of the
judgment is $625 million. 40 The surety bond companies contacted
by Loewen required a $625 million letter of credit as collateral.41
30. Krauss, supra note 25, at 77 (asking the question "What's Law Got To Do With
It?").
31. The Loewen Group, Inc., case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Krauss, supra note 25, at 78.
35. The Loewen Group, Inc. case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 96.
36. Id. para. 3.
37. Id. para. 118 (quoting N. Bernstein, Brash Funeral Chain Meets Its Match in
Old South, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at Al, A6).
38. Id. para. 3.
39. CanadianCorp. Found Liable, supra note 19.
40. The Loewen Group, Inc. case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 121.
41. Id.
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In its Notice of Claim, Loewen states that it would have incurred

"well over $200 million in costs in 1996 and 1997 alone to pursue
the appeal bond,"42 which Loewen would not recover even if it prevailed on appeal.4 3 The bond, however, may be reduced or eliminated for "good cause." 4 Loewen offered to post a bond for $125
million, which constituted 125% of the compensatory award. 45 The
Mississippi Supreme Court refused any reduction of the bond,
requiring Loewen to post a $625 million bond within a week.4 6
Loewen claims that this decision "effectively foreclosed [its]
appeal rights" and forced it to settle for $175 million.4 7
In November 1988, Loewen filed a claim for arbitration
against the United States. 41 It contended that the trial court proceedings and the Mississippi Supreme Court's refusal to reduce
the bond requirement constituted violations of NAFTA's Chapter
11.49 Specifically, Loewen alleged in its notice of claim that "[tihe
introduction of extensive anti-Canadian and pro-American testimony and counsel comments during the O'Keefe litigation violated" the anti-discrimination principles set forth in Article 1102
and the minimum standard of treatment guaranteed in Article
1105 of NAFTA. 5° Loewen also claims that "the discriminatory
conduct, excessive verdict, the denial of right to appeal, and the
coerced settlement violated Article 1110 of NAFTA, which bars
the uncompensated expropriation of investments of foreign
investors."5 1

III.
A.

METALCLAD CORP. V. THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES

Arbitral Awards

Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States52 is the only decision to date to find a violation of Article 1110's prohibition against
42. Id. para. 123, 127 (the $200 million figure stated by Loewen includes the
"bonding cost itself ...the cost of selling equity at a distressed price to finance the
bond, and the added cost of continuing to finance TLGI's operations.").
43. Id. para. 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. para. 6.
47. Id.
48. Christopher Dugan of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue's Washington, D.C., office
filed the arbitration claim on behalf of Loewen.
49. The Loewen Group, Inc. case no. ARB(AF)/98/3.
50. Id. para. 139.
51. Id. para. 7.
52. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
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uncompensated expropriation.53 The dispute arose from the activities of Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, in the Mexican Municipality
of Guadalcazar ("Guadalcazar"), in the Mexican State of San Luis
Potosi, ("SLP").54 Metalclad alleged that the United Mexican
States ("Mexico"), through its local governments of SLP and
Guadalcazar, interfered with the development and operation of a
hazardous waste landfill.5 5 The Government of Mexico and SLP
issued operating permits for the landfill, and federal authorities
assured Metalclad that it had all that was necessary to undertake
the landfill project.5 6 Relying on the representations of the federal
government, Metalclad began construction on the landfill until
Guadalcazar issued a "Stop Work Order."5 7 Guadalcazar refused
to issue the required permits for the landfill, citing local opposition and environmental concerns.58 Negotiation attempts failed,
and Metalclad filed a claim under NAFTA alleging violations of
Article 1105 and Article 1110.11 While the arbitration proceeding
was underway, the governor of SLP, three days before his term
expired, issued an ecological decree declaring the landfill a nature
reserve for the protection of rare cactus. ° The effect of the decree
"permanently precluded the operation of the landfill."61 Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal awarded Metalclad compensation in
the amount of U.S. $16.685 million.2
B.

Arbitral Award Appeal

Mexico challenged the arbitration award in the Supreme
Court of British Columbia, the location of the arbitral tribunal.
That court found the Metalclad Tribunal misconstrued applicable
law to include transparency obligations in Article 1105's guaranteed minimum standard of treatment.' The principle of transparency, which is mentioned in Article 102(1), is implemented
53. Vicki Been, NAFTA's Investment Protectionsand the Division of Authority for
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 32 ENWL. L. REP. 11001 (2002).
54. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. para. 1 at 37.
55. Id.
56. Id. paras. 78, 79 at 48.
57. Id. para. 87, at 48, 49.
58. Id. para. 92.
59. Been, supra note 53, at 11008.
60. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. para. 59 at 44.
61. Id.
62. Id. para. 131 at 54.
63. The United Mexican States v. Metalciad Corp., [2001] B.C.S.C. 664.
64. Id. para. 40.
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through the provisions of Chapter 18, not Chapter 11.65 Since the
Tribunal made its decision on the basis of transparency, the matter was beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration because
Chapter 11 contains no transparency obligations.6 6
The court temporally bifurcated its analysis of the alleged
Article 1110 violation into pre-ecological decree analysis and postecological decree analysis. The court held "that the Tribunal's
analysis of Article 1105 infected its analysis of Article 1110."11 In
finding a breach of Article 1105 on the basis of a lack of transparency and concluding that there had been expropriation within
the meaning of Article 1110, the Tribunal also decided a matter
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.6 9
The court went on to hold, however, that the Tribunal's finding that the Governor's ecological decree amounted to expropriation was not based on a lack of transparency or on the Tribunal's
finding of a breach of Article 1105; therefore, it "stands on its
own."70 The Tribunal's decision with respect to the ecological
decree was not found to be patently unreasonable.7 1 Although the
court found the Tribunal's definition of expropriation for purposes
of Article 1110 to be "extremely broad," that definition is a question of law and therefore was not subject to review.7'2 Accordingly,
the court upheld the award to the extent that it was based on the
Tribunal's conclusion that the ecological decree amounted to an
expropriation without compensation.73
IV.

A.

CHAPTER

11

Background

Provisions such as Chapter 11 are known as investor-state
provisions. 4 They are a departure from traditional international
law under which only states could bring actions against other
states.7 5 In general, countries that export capital favor investorstate provisions as a means to protect their citizens' assets from
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. para. 71.
Id. para. 72.
Id. paras. 77-101.
Id. para. 78.
Id. para. 79.
Id. para. 94.
Id. para. 97.
Id. para. 99.
Id. para. 105.
Lerner, supra note 5, at 233.
Id.
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expropriation in less-developed countries.76 In particular, the
United States has been enthusiastic about investor-state provisions, which, "in theory aid the development of an open trading
system."77
The United States has advocated these provisions in large
part because of fear of "foreign expropriation of U.S. investor
assets abroad."78 Consequently, Chapter l's underlying impetus
was a means of protecting U.S. and Canadian investments from
takings by the Mexican government.7 9 Without being able to
resort to international arbitration against this type of action, prospective U.S. and Canadian investors would be hesitant to invest
in Mexico because of fears that the Mexican courts offered insufficient protection against direct or creeping expropriation. 0 As a
result, a major theme behind Article 1110 "is to provide a level
playing field in an investment dispute with the Mexican government and to allow for arbitration outside of Mexico by an independent body."81 Given this background, it is ironic that Loewen, a
Canadian corporation, is employing Chapter l1's provisions,
which were originally incorporated into NAFTA to protect American investments from expropriation, to assail a decision of an
American court as an indirect expropriation.8 2
On the other hand, one might ask of Chapter 11, "'[if it's
applicable to Mexico, why not to the U.S.?''3 The U.S. and
76. Id.
77. Robert E. Lutz & Russell C. Trice, NAFTA at Five and the Loewen Case: Is
NAFTA the Blood Relative of Lady Justice or the Angel of Death for State
Sovereignty?, 2 TRANSLEX: TRANSNATL L. EXCHANGE 1 (Oct., 1999).
78. Lerner, supra note 5, at 245 (noting that U.S. investments have long been
beset with expropriations abroad, especially in Latin America. Examples include the
uncompensated expropriations in Cuba and the Mexican nationalization of the oil
industry in 1938).
79. Id.; see also Gregory M. Sterner, Note, Taking a ConstitutionalLook: NAFTA
Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States' ConstitutionalProtection of Property,
33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 405, 419 (2002) (explaining that the fear of expropriation of
foreign investments by Mexico, and in particular U.S. investments, was a key issue
raised during NAFTA negotiations. One of the primary motivations behind Article
1110 of Chapter 11 was to protect foreign investment by guarding against "arbitrary
and discriminatory government actions against foreign investors.").
80. Jenny Harbine, Casenote, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration:Deciding the Price
of Free Trade, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 371, 375 (2002).
81. Sterner, supra note 79, at 419. Even with the presence of investor state
provisions like Chapter 11 any government is still free to expropriate so long as it
pays just compensation. Under this principle, Chapter 11 targets the perception that
Mexican Courts are not reliably independent or fair.
82. Lerner, supra note 5, at 245.
83. Michael Goldhaber, Is NAFTA the Law of the Land?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER
(Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=
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Canada were concerned about the absence of the rule of law in
Mexico when drafting Chapter 11. This history, however, does not
exempt either country from application of the provision against
their respective governments. A rule of law problem may well
exist in Mississippi State courts. In other words, just because the
shoe is on the other foot does not mean that the shoe does not fit.
B.

Mechanics

Chapter 11 is divided into two sections. Section A, entitled
"Investment," establishes protective measures for foreign investments, and Section B, entitled "Settlement of Disputes between a
Party and an Investor of an Another Party," governs the arbitration process. 4 Loewen's Articles 1102, 1105, and 1110 claims fall
within Section A of Chapter 11.
1.

Article 1102

Article 1102 establishes "National Treatment."8 5 It provides
that parties to the agreement "shall accord to investors of another
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors" and "treatment no less favorable
than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors."8 Put simply, Article
1102 requires NAFTA Parties to "treat the investors of another
NAFTA Party and their investments no worse than it treats its
own investors and their investments."" Given the provision's limited scope, even if Loewen's allegations that prejudicial testimony
and comments based on nationality were introduced into the Mississippi State court trial proceedings are true, an Article 1102
argument is misplaced. 8 By analogy, if Loewen were, for example, a New York corporation doing business in Mississippi, introduction of that fact at trial would certainly not be considered
prejudicial. s9 The United States, in its Counter-Memorial, points
OpenMarketXcelerateNiew&c=LawArticle&cid= 1019508858614&live=true&cst=1&
pc=0&pa=0 (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) (quoting Christopher Dugan of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue).
84. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11.
85. Id. art. 1102.
86. Id. art. 1102(1), (3).
87. The United Mexican States, [2001] B.C.S.C. 664, para. 59.
88. See supra Part II. Similarly, because O'Keefe successfully destroyed diversity
of citizenship, arguments about the purpose of diversity jurisdiction are irrelevant.
89. It may be argued, however, that the treatment Loewen received was far more
prejudicial than merely pointing out its Canadian citizenship. See supra Part II.
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out that claimant fails to assert a "prima facie claim under . . .
Article 1102" because Loewen does not identify any United States
investor or what constitutes "like circumstances" for the purposes
comparison. 0 Loewen's Article 1102 claim therefore fails to distinguish between fact and law in that during the trial the treatment Loewen received was no less favorable than the treatment
accorded to similarly situated United States investors. Stated differently, American corporations often feel the sting of enormous
punitive damages awards entered against them in jury trials.
2.

Article 110591

Article 1105 establishes a minimum standard of treatment
that foreign investments must be accorded.92 Unlike Article 1102
and Article 1103 which are "framed in relative terms by way of
comparison to the way in which the NAFTA Party treats other
investors ... Article 1105 is framed in absolute terms."93 Article
1105 establishes a "minimum standard" below which Parties are
prohibited from treating investments of an investor of another
Party "irrespective of the manner in which the Party treats other
investors and their investments."94
To qualify as a breach of Article 1105, the treatment involved
"must fail to accord to international law." 95 Loewen's most plausible claim rests in its allegations of Article 1105 violations.9 6 But
here again, Loewen begins its argument by assuming that the
introduction of testimony and comments about its wealth and
Canadian citizenship during the state court proceedings infringes
upon its right to an "impartial trial untainted by invidious discrimination."9 7 The United States points out, however, that the
90. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, at 4.
91. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1103 (establishing "Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment"). This article ensures that no member of the agreement may accord less
favorable treatment to an investor of a Party than it accords to an investor of a nonParty. Id. art. 1103(1). In other words, NAFTA Parties "must treat the investors of

another Party and their investments no worse than it treats the investors of any other
Party or non-party and their investments." The United Mexican States, [2001]
B.C.S.C. 664, para. 59. Loewen's NAFTA claim does not, nor did Metalclad in its
claim allege a violation of Article 1103.
92. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105.
93. The United Mexican States, [2001] B.C.S.C. 664, para. 60.
94. Id.
95. Id. para. 62.
96. Loewen also contends that other violations of Article 1105 include the "grossly
excessive verdict" and the Mississippi Supreme Court's application of the bonding
requirement. Loewen's denial of justice claim is discussed infra Part V.
97. The Loewen Group, Inc. case. No. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 141.
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trial proceedings were "conducted in a manner consonant with the
dictates of adversarial justice" and, moreover, the difficulties
encountered by Loewen were the result of its "strategic choices or
miscalculations. "98 This observation further obscures Loewen's
claim. Loewen predicates its claim on the assumption that a violation of Article 1105 has indeed occurred, thereby circumventing
pertinent issues to the penultimate question of whether civil trial
proceedings subject to appellate review could ever constitute a violation of international law.99
V.

DENIAL OF JUSTICE

The United States has long supported the principle that
nations are liable for injustices committed in their courts."°
Claims based on denial of substantive justice, however, are
extremely difficult to make. 1 1 International law sources are in
agreement that "mere error in a decision is not enough to constitute a denial of substantive justice. Gross defects in the substance
of the judgment must exist."" 2 Nevertheless, the United States
has often "endorsed the view that denials of justice include manifestly unjust decisions."103 For example, in the Denham Claim

against Panama, the United States argued "'a nation is responsible for the manifestly unjust decisions of its courts.'"104
10
Loewen claim subjects U.S. courts to the same doctrine.

5

The

98. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, at 132. But see The Loewen Group, Inc., case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Jennings Op. (Professor Sir Robert Jennings, former President of
the International Court of Justice, opining that the Mississippi verdict was a denial of
justice); see also id. Neely Aff. at 3 (Richard Neely, former Chief Justice of West
Virginia Court of Appeals, opining that the O'Keefe v. Loewen litigation was a
"mockery of justice").
99. "International law" as used in Article 1105 refers to customary international
law, which is to be distinguished from conventional international law. The United
Mexican States, [2001] B.C.S.C. 664, para. 62. Customary international law is
developed by common practices of countries whereas treaties entered into by
countries comprise conventional international law. Id. The Metalclad appeal
resolved this distinction and thereby set aside a portion of the Tribunal's ruling,
prompting one commentator to note that judicial review may be an available avenue
to circumvent NAFTA's binding arbitration. Brower, supra note 3, at 47. Should the
Loewen Tribunal find in favor of the claimant, the United States may likewise seek
judicial review anticipating a more favorable decision.
100. Lerner, supra note 5, at 247.
101. Id. at 261.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 262.
104. Id. (quoting Denham Claim (United States v. Panama 1933), Hunt's Report
491, 506 (1934)).
105. Id. at 247.
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Researching Loewen's claim that a jury award rendering
money damages against a foreign investor could constitute a prohibited expropriation, one is astounded at the absence of authority
available on the subject. Weston notes that "it is very hard to get
agreement on whether one or a combination of governmental acts"
10 6
constitutes an expropriation "giving rise to State responsibility."
The problem arises from the complexity of the facts involved,
attendant burdens of proof, and subjective responses to the facts
at issue. 1 7 More importantly, international law scholars and
practitioners have simply failed to provide a systematic appraisal
of ways foreign investors may be deprived of wealth through the
exercise of a State's police powers.18 Consequently, Loewen's
claim is based on tenuous arguments which lack any relevant
authority. Furthermore, since it bears the burden of proof,
Loewen's NAFTA and hypothetical juxtapositions to denial of justice claims do not pass scrutiny.
Loewen asserts as settled principle that "egregiously wrong
judicial judgment[s]" violate an international law principle
referred to as "denial of justice."0 9 A violation of the minimum
standard treatment for aliens can be analogized to a denial of justice. 1 0 The term denial of justice, however, is difficult to define."'
In the most extreme application, the phrase "seems to embrace
the whole field of State responsibility, and has been applied to all
types of wrongful conduct on the part of the State toward
aliens." 2 Under that definition, denial of justice encompasses
judicial conduct as well as executive and legislative conduct."1
The Loewen Tribunal's conception of the term "measure," which
includes the judgment of a state court, embraces this position.
Given the attendant burden of proof that a denial ofjustice allegation requires, however, a NAFTA Tribunal will not likely conclude
that an unenforced jury award of punitive damages benefiting a
private individual in a suit between private litigants is in fact a
denial of justice.
106. Burns H. Weston, "ConstructiveTakings" Under InternationalLaw: A Modest
Foray into the Problem of "CreepingExpropriation,"16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 103, 105-106
(1975).
107. Id. at 106.
108. Id.
109. The Loewen Group, Inc. case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 145 (citing Rihani claim,
Decision 27-C, American Mexican Claims Report, 254, 257 (1948)).
110. Lerner, supra note 5, at 248.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 250.
113. Id.
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In its most limited construction, denial of justice is restricted
to State refusal to "grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of
a court to pronounce a judgment."11 4 An intermediate construction
of the phrase refers to "improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of access to courts,
inadequate procedures, and unjust decisions.""5 This intermediate construction includes "both procedural and substantive wrongdoing by the court-both improper procedures and unjust
decisions." 6 The facts underlying the Loewen claim meet this
test. Loewen seems to incorporate this conception of the term in
its claim by characterizing the introduction of prejudicial testimony concerning its alienage at trial and the subsequent denial of
its motion to reduce the appeal bond as procedural wrongdoing
and by claiming that the size of the award epitomizes an unjust
decision.
Loewen's argument, though attractive at first glance, unravels when the procedural hurdles it faces are duly considered. The
United States interprets the denial of justice standard to require a
decision of a court of last resort as a necessary predicate to a
denial of justice claim." 7 International law acknowledges that
errors occur in all systems of justice. When a tribunal evaluates
whether a state has performed its obligation to provide an adequate system of justice to aliens, it must therefore consider the
appellate mechanisms available in that state's system of justice."'
The United States judicial system does provide a means for correcting lower-court error, including the type of error alleged by
Loewen. According to this standard of denial of justice, Loewen
must demonstrate that it had no recourse to appellate review in
order to establish a denial of justice claim.
Mississippi is not peculiar in that a stay of execution of a
judgment pending appeal is not automatic. The bond requirement
at issue in Loewen's claim is a feature common to legal systems
around the world."' Both common law and civil law jurisdictions
provide procedures pending an appeal to protect the interests of a
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 250- 51.
117. 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 707, 709. The United States first advanced this
interpretation of the denial ofjustice standard in its Counter-Memorial to the Loewen
Tribunal.
118. Id. at 708.
119. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7,at 144-50. The United States lists examples
of appellate procedures in several jurisdictions.
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litigant who has won a judgment. 120 The Mississippi courts' decision denying a reduction in the amount of the bond requirement
simply does not translate into a denial of justice. Indeed, as the
United States articulates in its Counter-Memorial, Loewen cites
no case that stands for the proposition that the existence or application of a bond requirement amounts to a denial of justice.12 1
Loewen attempts to demonstrate that its access to appellate
review was denied when the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to
reduce the amount of the supersedeas bond required to stay execution of the judgment pending appeal. The fact remains, however, that had Loewen posted the $625 million dollar bond it
would have had access to the appeals process. Loewen simply
argues that the cost of pursuing the supersedeas bond was too
high and that the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision effectively
foreclosed its right to appeal the trial court judgment entered
against it. Unable to exercise its right to appeal, Loewen argues it
was forced to settle the underlying litigation.
VI.

THE PENNZOIL PROBLEM

Loewen seeks recourse on the supersedeas bond issue through
NAFTA on a denial of justice claim under similar circumstances in
which Texaco made an unsuccessful attempt on the same issue
through the federal courts on due process grounds. 2 2 In Pennzoil
v. Texaco, a jury returned a verdict against Texaco for tortiously
inducing breach of contract. 2 ' Texaco would have been required
to post a bond of more than $13 billion in order to pursue an
appeal pursuant to Texas law. 124 Before the Texas court entered
judgment, Texaco filed an action in federal district court that
alleged the application of the bond provisions would effectively
deny it a right to an appeal. 125 Though Pennzoil v. Texaco turned
on the abstention doctrine rather than resolving the constitutional
issue involved, the concurring opinion of two U.S. Supreme Court
Justices noted, in relevant part,
Texaco clearly could exercise its right to appeal ... even if it
were forced to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Texaco ...
120. See generally Peter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on JudicialDecisions,
in 16 INT'L ENCYCL. COMP. L. 8, at 9 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1982).
121. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, at 143.
122. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 1519 (1987).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1523.
125. Id. at 1524.
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could go forward with the appeal, and if it did prevail on its appeal
in Texas courts, the bankruptcy proceedings could be terminated.
Texaco simply fails to show how the initiation of corporate reorganization activities would prevent it from obtaining meaningful
appellate review.'2 6
Similarly, Loewen's constitutional right to appeal could have
been vindicated if it had sought appellate review even if doing so
meant facing the prospect of bankruptcy. 127 Loewen's end run
attempt around state law supersedeas bond requirements by
resorting to NAFTA should fail as did Texaco's attempt to avoid
the bond requirement by resorting to the federal courts.
VII.
A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

American Jurisprudence

In recent years, the concept of awarding punitive damages
has been attacked in the United States. 28 In BMW of North
America v. Gore, the Supreme Court invalidated a state court
punitive damage award solely because of its excessive amount.'2 9
The Court announced a three-prong test. In determining excessiveness of punitive damage awards, the reviewing court should
consider: (1) the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's
actions; (2) the "disparity between the harm or potential harm"
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between imposed penalties in similar cases. 130 The
Court, however, by refusing "to draw a bright line marking the
limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award,"
provided little guidance to courts for future cases.13 ' Because the
126. Id. at 1531-32 (Brennan and Marshall, J. J., concurring).
127. The juxtaposed cases are distinguishable in that Texaco sought to circumvent
a state law supersedeas bond requirement on constitutional grounds by filing in
federal court before attempting any recourse at the state level. Loewen sought the
same by filing a NAFTA claim after appealing the issue at the state level.
Irrespective of these differences, analysis of the procedural steps taken by Loewen
results in an analogous conclusion, namely, that like Texaco, Loewen did not exhaust
its right to appeal at the state level and therefore recourse outside of state court
proceedings is unavailable.
128. See generally Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell
for Jury Assessed Punitive Damages?A CriticalRe-examination of the American Jury,
36 U.S.F.L. REV. 411(2002) (providing overview of punitive damage jurisprudence in
the United States).
129. BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that $2
million punitive damages award is grossly excessive and therefore exceeds the
constitutional limit).
130. Id. at 575.
131. Id. at 582-583.
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O'Keefe v. Loewen dispute settled, the judgment was never
enforced. Consequently, the question of whether the punitive
damages award entered against Loewen fails the Gore test was
not reached.
Punitive damages are not traditionally available for breach of
contract.132 Most jurisdictions do, however, allow punitive damages in breach of contract cases if the breach constitutes an "independent tort."'33 O'Keefe's complaint against Loewen alleged, in
addition to breach of contract, common-law fraud and violations of
state antitrust laws. Thus, O'Keefe's additional allegations triggered the "independent tort" exception to the general bar against
punitive damages in disputes founded on breach of contract.
B.

InternationalJurisprudence

A majority of nations find American punitive damages awards
particularly suspect. Because their domestic laws do not recognize civil punitive damages at all, these countries often refuse to
enforce punitive damage awards rendered in American courts.
Thus, as Loewen contends, an excessive punitive damages
award could constitute a denial of substantive justice under international law. Claims contesting American judgments rendering
punitive damages awards have particular significance with regard
to internationally recognized procedural rights: "the right to an
impartial tribunal and to freedom from unfair discrimination
against the alien because of alienage." 14 The argument is made
by analogy to the international law approach to criminal cases
wherein "courts are said to violate international law when they
impose unreasonably harsh sentences on aliens." 3 51 Following this
reasoning, an essential criterion in which to judge measures
alleged to be expropriations is to determine to what extent they
violate human rights principles.'
Where measures are deemed
abusive of this minimum standard, then, according to Weston, a
demand for compensation is justified. Nevertheless, Loewen has
132. See RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS,

intro, note to ch. 16, at 100 (1981)

("The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the
promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the promise for the loss
resulting from breach."). But see William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in
Contracts,48 DuKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing that punitive damages should be allowed
for any willful breach of contract).
133. Dodge, supra note 132, at 637.
134. Lerner, supra note 5, at 252.
135. Id. at 264.
136. Weston, supra note 106, at 131.
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failed to meet the burden of proof required by this extreme allegation. The judgment against it was never enforced,137 therefore,
Loewen asserts nothing more than an argument about what constitutes an unreasonable jury award.

VIII.

DEFERENCE TO THE JUDICIARY

In its notice of claim, Loewen contends that "[tihe conduct of
the O'Keefe litigation violated" Article 1102's prohibition on discrimination against foreign investors and their investments, Article 1105's guaranteed minimum standard of treatment for
investments of foreign investors, and Article 1110's prohibition on
uncompensated or discriminatory expropriation of investments of
foreign investors.138 In its answer to Loewen's claim that the Mississippi judgment was "tantamount to" an expropriation and also
amounted to an indirect expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110,
the United States argues that there is "no support in international
case law for the proposition that a civil judgment entering money
damages against a foreign investor in a private dispute can constitute an expropriation." 3 9 It is well established that judicial acts
violate international obligations only in extreme circumstances
and that acts of the judiciary are accorded greater deference under
customary international law than are legislative or administrative actions. 4 ° The United States correctly points out that the
international minimum standard found in Article 1105 "requires
the Tribunal to consider the United States' system of justice as a
whole.., in assessing whether there was a denial of justice in this
4
case."' '
The United States' reasoning, while correct in regard to applicable case law, fails to acknowledge arguments pointing to the
opposite conclusion. "The fact that an award was made by a jury
does not exempt it from the international rule that nations are
liable for denials of justice by their courts." 42 This position recognizes that the jury "is but a particular kind of accessory in a chosen mechanism of judicial administration, a link in the chain of
137. Loewen argues that the judgment was never enforced because it was forced to
settle. Procedural aspects of the case, however, make this reasoning problematic.
Namely, Loewen could have appealed by allowing execution of the judgment or by
resorting to bankruptcy.
138. The Loewen Group, Inc., case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 138.
139. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, at 181.
140. Id. at 117.
141. Id. at 124.
142. Lerner, supra note 5, at 266.
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justice which is ultimately open to inspection in all its constituJudges and juries
ents by the processes of international law."'
are, after all, "inseparable parts of the judicial organ," and it follows, therefore, that where the actions of either constitute a denial
of justice, the state is equally accountable.14 This proposition is
supported by the statements of the former president of the International Court of Justice who points out that "[a]lthough independent of the Government, the judiciary is not independent of the
State: the judgment given by judicial authority emanates from an
organ of the state in just the same way as a law promulgated by
the legislature or a decision taken by the executive."' 45 While,
hypothetically speaking, the argument seems logical enough, it
simply does not comport with the facts underlying Loewen's claim.
In order to reach this stage of the denial of justice claim, Loewen
must first prove that during the state court proceedings a NAFTA
violation occurred and culminated into a denial of justice.
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, "[a] state is not responsible for loss of property or for other
economic disadvantage resulting from.., action of the kind that is
commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not
discriminatory." 4 6 Loewen's argument seems to understand this
principle to mean that if the trial were discriminatory then the
state would be responsible. In order for the state to be responsible
for the litigation and the subsequent money damages against
Loewen, however, the American jury system itself would have to
amount to action that is not commonly accepted within the police
powers of states. In other words, Loewen approaches the argument from the wrong starting point. Additionally, its claim is not
clearly tendered and its analysis is circular, thus avoiding critical
issues that pertain to the expropriation question.
IX.

ARTICLE

1110

Loewen also claims that the U.S. has violated Article 1110 on
"Expropriation and Compensation," arguably the most important
article within Section A. Article 1110 provides:
[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 275- 276.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 712 cmt. g. (1986).
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or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with
paragraphs 2 through 6."'
"'Investment,' as defined in Article 1139, is an expansive term
extending to any 'enterprise,' equity and debt securities, loans,
real estate, or other property, tangible or intangible."14 Article
201 defines "measure" to include "any law, regulation, procedure,
Pursuant to Article 1110,
requirement or practice."1 49
"[c]ompensation shall be paid without delay," "be equivalent to the
fair market value of the expropriated investment," and "include
interest ... from the date of expropriation" until payment. 5 °
Article 1110's prohibition on expropriation 'covers direct,
indirect and so-called 'creeping' expropriation."' 5" This inference
is drawn from Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws
of the United States § 712(g), entitled Expropriation or regulation,
which states that it "applies not only to avowed expropriations in
which the government formally takes title to property, but also to
other actions of the government that have the effect of 'taking'
property, in whole or in large part, outright or in stages ('creeping
expropriation')."'52 Some commentators contend that the term
"creeping expropriation" is "too polemic."15 3 In addition, they
argue that the term suggests a host State's attempt to do in a
"round-about way" what it could not do directly: nationalize the
foreign investment concerned.' While this distinction is relevant
in analysis of the Metalclad outcome, a case where several regulatory measures, including the infamous cacti reserve, were ultimately deemed to have effectuated an expropriation, it bears no
147. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110.
148. Beauvais, supra note 17, at 249.
149. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 201.
150. Id. art. 1110.
151. Benton Cantey, Comment, International Arbitration to Resolve Disputes
Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 285, 289 (2001)
(quoting Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW 727, 730 (1993)).
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 712 cmt. g. (1986).
153. D.C. DICKE, SEMANTICS OF WEALTH DEPRIVATION AND THEIR LEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE, in COLLECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 249, 250 (Ignaz Seidi-Hohenveldera ed., 1998).

154. Id.
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relationship to Loewen's claim. Unlike the investment at issue in
the Metalclad case, the government did not abrogate Loewen's
investment. 5 5 The money damages entered against Loewen were
not instigated by the United States. Rather, the judgment against
Loewen was the product of a lawsuit between private litigants
founded, inter alia, on breach of contract. 15 6 Furthermore, the
damages entered against Loewen, which were never paid, benefited a private citizen, whereas in the Metalclad case, the Mexican
government received the environmental benefit of the cacti
reserve. The damages award rendered against Loewen represents
the cost of violating domestic law, not an expropriation. Loewen's
claim at best demonstrates the absurd outcomes that fickle juries
occasionally render. Furthermore, because Loewen settled the litigation rather than seeking an appeal from the trial court judgment, it is a stretch to argue that an expropriation occurred. In
any case, as the United States insists, "NAFTA is not a no-fault
insurance policy," available to provide Loewen a means to recoup
its losses.'5 7
The effectuation of an expropriation, however, does not necessarily require nationalization of the investment or property at
issue. "Constructive takings" is the concept that governments, in
the absence of "physical occupation or transfer of title," may effectively deprive foreign investors of the use and enjoyment of their
investments.'5 8 As discussed in the preceding paragraph, "creeping expropriation" is a category of constructive takings where a
government "deprives a foreign investor of property by means of
cumulative imposition of regulatory measures, any one of which
might be permissible, but whose success leads to compensable
expropriation." 9 Applicable international law rules in the area of
expropriation are ambiguous at best.16 Writers on the subject are
often struck at how little authority exists on "'the making of the
distinction between compensable takings and regulatory non-compensable takings.""6 ' It has been postulated that, "certain acts of
wealth deprivation by definition exclude the payment of any com155. Metalclad's investment was not technically nationalized because it retained
title to the land.
156. The Loewen Group, Inc., case no. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 33.
157. Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, at 3.
158. Beauvais, supra note 17, at 259.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 259- 260 (quoting M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS 300-01 (1994)).
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pensation."1 62 Under this analysis, where the authorities intend to
impose a financial loss on an individual as a punishment no compensation would be due. 163 This type of wealth deprivation has
been referred to not as "expropriation" but rather as "condemnation" in an effort to show its penal character. 164 A jury award of
punitive damages in a civil suit comports with this proposition.
In Metalclad, the decision of the tribunal and subsequent
appeal focused on the fact that the claimant had been completely
deprived of any meaningful return on its investment by what was
deemed to be egregious state action.165 NAFTA tribunals consistently interpret the customary international law definition of
expropriation to require, at a minimum, substantial deprivation of
the economic use of the investment at issue.' The Metalclad outcome, however, turned essentially on the fact that reprehensible
government conduct resulted in the complete loss of the foreign
investor's investment.'6 7 Accordingly, it appears that both the
predicate of egregious state conduct and the resulting foreclosure
of a return on the investor's investment are necessary elements of
a successful Chapter 11 claim.
In contrast to the Metalclad case where an expropriation
occurred at the hands of a government actor's ecological decree,
the damages awarded against Loewen arose from litigation
between private individuals. 6 Loewen's claim, founded on a state
court's punitive damages award, lacks the egregious government
conduct prong of the equation. Moreover, it fails to satisfy the
deprivation of investment prong since the punitive damages
award was never enforced. The Loewen case merely illustrates
capricious state action, not a violation of Chapter 11 under any
analysis.
Thus far only a small number of Article 1110 claims have
been decided through the arbitral process.'6 9 As such,
"[slignificant questions remain regarding the provision's potential
162. DicKE, supra note 153, at 251.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Beauvais, supra note 17, at 281.
166. Id. at 285 (noting that "[riegulations that merely affect some property interest
or decrease the profitability of business simply do not fall within Article 1110's
purview.").
167. Id. at 285.
168. It may be argued, however, that "[aln expropriation may occur where the state
simply acts as an instrument of redistribution." Lutz & Trice, supra note 77, at 3.
169. Beauvais, supra note 17, at 287.
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scope."'70 Some argue that the resulting uncertainty is problematic, reasoning that where "governments are unsure of the governing standard, regulatory measures within the 'penumbra' of
Article 1110 may be chilled, and firms may continue to use the
threat of indirect expropriation claims as a 'sword' in policy
debates and legislative lobbying. "171 Support exists for this contention as Chapter 11 tribunals have rejected member State arguments that environmental or social regulations fall outside the
scope of Article 1110 because they embody legitimate exercises of
state regulatory "police power." 172 An overview of the decisions
handed down by the NAFTA Tribunals indicates that they
"represent fact-based equitable judgments in which the legal standard is, to some extent, both malleable and peripheral."7 3 The
Loewen claim will likely prove unsuccessful as the underlying dispute does not derive from inequitable action instigated by the
state but rather from an unexpected outcome, of which the State
was not the beneficiary.
X.

ARBITRATION PROCESS

Section B of Chapter 11 establishes the arbitration procedure.1 74 Article 1119 provides that a "disputing investor shall
deliver to the disputing Party written notice of its intention to
submit a claim to arbitration at least 90 days before the claim is
submitted." 75 Investors may submit claims to the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") if the
investor and the host country are parties to the ICSID Convention.'7 6 Commentators note "the ICSID is a product of the World
Bank."17 The driving force behind the World Bank's creation of
ICSID was a belief that an institution specifically designed to
facilitate settlements of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors would promote increased flows of
international investment. 78 If only the investor or the government is a party to the Convention but not both, the claim may be
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 290.
173. Id. at 292.
174. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11.
175. Id. art. 1119.
176. Cantey, supra note 151, at 292.
177. Id. at 297.
178. The World Bank Group, About ICSID, available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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brought under the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID or the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules."' Currently, the United States is the
only party to the ICSID Convention and consequently, only U.S.
investors, or claims against the United States, may be heard
under the Additional Facility Rules.' s Both the Metalclad claim,
which involved American investors, and the Loewen claim to
which the United States is a party, fall under the ICSID
Convention.
NAFTA arbitration tribunals are comprised of three arbitra" ' Each party to the dispute appoints one
tors.18
arbitrator and the
third arbitrator, "the presiding arbitrator," is agreed on by the
parties.'82 If the parties are unable to agree on the presiding arbitrator within 90 days, the ICSID Secretary General appoints

one. 183
Though the arbitration process does not provide for appeals,
arbitral judgments may be challenged in the national court of the
country where the tribunal sits.'
Article 1136 recognizes by
implication the right of losing parties to seek revision or annulment of Chapter 11 awards by municipal courts at the seat of arbitration. Prevailing parties may not seek enforcement of awards
rendered under the Additional Facility or UNCITRAL Rules until
either: (1) three months have passed without the losing party having initiated a proceeding to revise, set aside, or annul the award;
or, (2) a court has dismissed or allowed such a proceeding and
there is no further appeal.8 5 The Government of Mexico appealed
the Metalclad Tribunal's decision through this process. If
Loewen's claim proves successful, the United States will likely
seek an appeal of the decision through the same process.
XT.

CHAPTER 11 OPPONENTS

The Loewen case demonstrates a creative use of Chapter 11
by attempting to recover losses incurred in litigation between private parties. 8 6 The case is unusual because, while most complaints are founded on regulatory takings, it assails a judicial
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Cantey, supra note 151, at 292.
Id. at 292-293.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1123.
Id.
Id. art. 1124.
Harbine, supra note 80, at 378.
Brower, supra note 3, at 52.
Lerner, supra note 5, at 245.
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decision of a member Party.'87 Though Metalclad is the only case
judged to have effectuated an expropriation, regulatory takings
Chapter 11 have led to at least one sigclaims filed under NAFTA
18 8
nificant settlement.
NAFTA opponents equate successful Chapter 11 investor
claims to affronts on the sovereignty of NAFTA Parties and argue
that member States did not contemplate the liabilities incurred
when they are found liable for investors' losses arising from state
and municipal regulation.'8 9 The opposition contends that Chapter 11 claims and resultant member State liability is particularly
dangerous given the zeal with which businesses have employed
Chapter l's binding arbitration. 190 Environmentalists have even
reached the conclusion '"that the private rights of foreign investors are being used not as defensive protection against government abuse because an investor is a foreign-owned company, but
as a strategic offensive threat to be wielded against government
decision-makers rendering or considering decisions adverse to the
interests of the company involved."""' They reason that Chapter
11 brought into being a path through which foreign investors are
able to sue NAFTA Parties, who were formerly impervious to private investor lawsuits, over any regulation that impairs an investor's property interests. 9 2 Advocacy groups such as Public Citizen
and Friends of the Earth are lobbying for renegotiation of Chapter
11 to prevent future arbitrations. 193 Despite such protests, regulatory expropriation claims simply have not borne out to be as subversive of environmental and social regulation as such groups

fear. 194
Advocacy groups have taken notice of the Loewen filing under
NAFTA and attacked it as evidence of NAFTA's infringement on
U.S. sovereignty.19 5 Public Citizen has devoted a substantial portion of its web page to NAFTA claims and, in particular, to the
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada. (NAFTA Chapter 11 suit
brought by an American corporation against the Government of Canada, which
settled for $13 million).
189. Harbine, supra note 80, at 376.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Howard Mann, NAFTA and the Environment, Lessons for the
Future, 13 TuL. ENvTL. L.J., 387, 405 (2000)).
192. Cantey, supra note 151, at 289.
193. Lerner, supra note 5, at 243.
194. Beauvais, supra note 17, at 295.
195. Lerner, supra note 5, at 243.
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Loewen case.196 In a statement released by Public Citizen, the
Loewen arbitration was called "an all-out attack on democracy,"
which, if successful, "would undermine the jury system, which is
fundamental to our system of justice."197 Such a contentious view,
however, does not survive scrutiny. Indeed, most nations that
utilize the jury system only do so in criminal prosecutions. Moreover, legal scholars often postulate that that use of the jury in civil
suits acts as an impediment, particularly in commercial disputes,
to expedient and fair adjudication of cases.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Loewen has premised its case on the existence of NAFTA violations in the state court proceedings that, in turn, culminate into
a denial of justice claim. Its claim, however, is not clearly tendered. Loewen's evidence of the NAFTA violations is based solely
on the surrounding circumstances of the case and fails to show
that the Mississippi state court procedures did indeed violate
NAFTA provisions. Furthermore, since Loewen never paid the
jury's verdict, arguments about excessive awards in violation of an
international minimum standard are inappropriate. The facts
underlying Loewen's claim, no matter how distasteful they may be
to the claimant, simply do not establish a violation of NAFTA.
Because Loewen must prove that the Mississippi State court procedures violated Chapter 11 of NAFTA and because a denial of
justice allegation is extremely serious and difficult to make,
Loewen's claim will likely be unsuccessful.
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196. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, available at http://www.citizen.org/
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